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whereas the Stine decision makes future agreements enforceable. Also,
Stine deals with labor relations alone, and some states distinguish be-
tween commercial and labor arbitration as to applicable law.30 There-
fore, whether Stine -will be followed in a commercial arbitration case
in Nevada is not certain although the language of the opinion seems
to declare that future agreements in both labor and commercial arbi-
tration are enforceable.
It is submitted that in the interest of certainty, the legislature of
Nevada as well as other states should adopt an act similar to the
American Arbitration Association Draft Act which enforces submis-
sion agreements and future agreements in both commercial and labor
arbitration. The commendable result so painstakingly achieved by
the Nevada court could be more easily achieved by the legislature.
KENNETH 0. HUNTINGDON, JR.
PRIVILEGE AGAINST COMPELLED ADVERSE
TESTIMONY BY A SPOUSE
The privilege against adverse spousal testimony in criminal cases,
though severely criticized by writers,' is still a fundamental privilege
associated with marriage. In a typical case, the privilege belongs to
the defendant-husband. But, when the husband commits a crime
against the person of the wife, the common law has consistently recog-
nized an exception by holding that the husband loses his privilege.
The problem then becomes whether or not the privilege originally be-
longed to both spouses.2 If it did, then the witness-wife should also
3°Sixteen states and the federal government have enacted arbitration statutes
patterned after the Draft Act. See note 9 supra. Eight of these states and Congress
have excluded labor-management contracts from the operation of their statute. 19
Mo. L. Rev. 280, 283 (1954). These states are Arizona, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Ohio, Oregon, Louisiana, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. Also see Plock, Methods
Adopted by States for Settlement of Labor Disputes Without Original Recourse to
Courts, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 430 433-36 (1949)-
'For criticism of and argument against the privilege see 3 Vernier, American
Family Laws § 226 (1935); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3 d ed. 1940); Hines, Priv-
ileged Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, '9 Calif. L. Rev. 390 ('93i);
Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family Relations,
13 Minn. L. Rev. 675 (1929); 4 Ark. L. Rev. 426 (195o).
-2t has been said that a wife was compellable at common law in a case involving
the exception of necessity. Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against
the Other in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (955)- If the privilege belongs
to the husband-defendant alone, then there is no problem, as the exception destroys
his privilege and the wife is compellable as an ordinary witness. England solved
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be able to exercise a privilege and refuse to testify. If not, she can be
compelled to testify as any ordinary witness. Recently the United
States Supreme Court recognized that the witness has a privilege,
but held that a wife-victim in a Mann Act case would not be allowed
to exercise it.
3
In Wyatt v. United States,4 the defendant was charged with trans-
porting a woman in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitu-
tion.5 Subsequent to the offense, but prior to the prosecution, the
woman became his wife.6 At the trial in the District Court, the wife-
victim was compelled to testify over her own and the defendant-
husband's objections, and the defendant was convicted.7 The Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, basing its decision on the
exception that the husband does not have a privilege when the wife
is the victim of the offense.8 The Court distinguished Hawkins v.
United States,9 a recent United States Supreme Court decision holding
that a wife cannot voluntarily testify against her husband in a criminal
prosecution over his objection, on the ground that in Hawkins the
wife was not the victim of the offense, thus the exception did not
apply-10
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court upheld the con-
the problem by considering the rule as one of competency; hence the exception
made her competent and thus compellable. Rex v. Lapworth [1931] 1 K.B. 117;
Compellability of Husband and Wife as Witnesses Against One Another in Criminal
Cases, 94 J.P. 691 (193o); 47 L.Q. Rev. 1 (1931). However, where the privilege belongs
to the witness-wife or to both spouses, the problem of compellability becomes more
difficult. In Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1949), the court in a
Mann Act case said in dictum that both parties had the privilege, but because of
public policy both parties were denied the privilege when the offense was committed
against the spouse. See 48 Mich. L. Rev. 546 (195o). However, the Supreme Court in
Wyatt v. United States, completely discredited this dictum by saying that the mere
fact that one party had lost his privilege did not waive the other party's privilege.
362 U.S. 525, 529 (1960).
3Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960).
4Ibid.
5A violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
362 U.S. at 526. The Supreme Court failed to consider the fact that the offense
occurred before marriage. The exception of necessity (see note 26 infra) usually
does not apply to offenses committed before marriage, the technical reason given
by the courts being that the witness was not a wife at the time of the offense and
the exception is only for the protection of wives. United States v. Gwynne, 209
Fed. 993 (E.D. Pa. 1914); State v. McKay, 122 Iowa 658, 98 NAV. 51o (i9o4); State
v. Woods, 13o Kan. 492, 287 Pac. 248 (1930); 8 'Wigmore, Evidence § 2230 (3d ed.
1940); 4 Ark. L. Rev. 426 (195o). See also Annot., 76 A.L.R. 1o88 (1932).
7362 U.S. at 526.
6Wyatt v. United States, 263 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1959).
"358 U.S. 74 (1958).
"See note 8 supra.
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viction.11 The Court reaffirmed the Hawkins rule,12 but held that the
husband lost his privilege because a Mann Act prosecution falls with-
in the exception. 3 The Court also held that .even though the de-
fendant had lost his privilege the witness-wife also had a privilege,
and the loss by the defendant did not automatically waive the witness's
privilege.14 This brought the Court to a review of congressional policy
underlying the White Slave Act, and the Court found that under the
Act the woman is presumed to have no independent will.5 Thus in
Mann Act prosecutions 6 the wife-victim may be presumed to be act-
ing under the influence of her husband's stronger will in refusing to
testify against him; hence her adverse testimony could be compelled.
The dissenting Justices felt that the case did not warrant such a
"radical departure from the Hawkins rule"' 7 and maintained that
the majority had completely misinterpreted the intent underlying
the Mann Act.' 8
The common-law privilege19 against the adverse testimony of
spouses20 in criminal trials2' has been recognized since the time of
Lord Coke.22 Fundamentally, it is a privilege preventing a party to a
"Wyatt v. United States, 362 US. 525 (1960).
"'Id. at 526.
"Id. at 526-27. It might be argued that the exception should not apply in this
case as the witness was not a wife at the time of the offense, see note 6 supra; and
also, the offense was not one of physical violence. See note 26 infra.
14362 U.S. at 528-29.
15Id. at 530. White Slave Traffic Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2422 (1958).
"The court specifically limited the decision to Mann Act prosecutions. 362 U.S.
at 531.
17362 U.S. at 531-32. The dissenting opinion was written by Chief Justice Warren
joined by Justices Black and Douglas.
"Id. at 531-38.
"The modern feeling is that this rule of evidence is a privilege and not a
question of competency, but some authorities still consider it an incompetency. See
McCormick, Evidence § 66 (1954); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (1935);
8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (3d ed. 194o); Hines, Privileged Testimony of Husband
and Wife in California, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 390 (1931); 4 Ark. L. Rev. 426 (1950);
38 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1952); 12 Vand. L. Rev. 947 (1959).
"OThe privilege against adverse spousal testimony is one of four related evidence
subjects. The other three are: (i) the disqualification and incompetency of the
testimony of one spouse for and in behalf of the other; (2) the privilege against testi-
mony concerning confidential communications between spouses; and (3) the dis-
qualification of either spouse to testify to non-access in marriage so as to bastardize
a child born in wedlock. McCormick, Evidence §§ 66, 82 (1954); 4 Ark. L. Rev.
426 (195o).
" 2The privilege has been largely eliminated in civil trials. McCormick, Evidence
§ 66 (1954); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (1935); 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2245 (3d ed. 194o); 19 Fed. B.J. 85 (1959).
"8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2227 (3d ed. 194o); Hines, Privileged Testimony of
Husband and Wife in California, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 390 (1931); 19 Fed. B.J. 85 (1959).
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valid marriage23 from appearing as a witness in opposition to a
spouse's interest 24 in a criminal trial. The best approach is to con-
sider the privilege as belonging to both the defendant-spouse and the
witness-spouse.2 At an early date, the common law began to recognize
an exception to the general rule which was based upon necessity
and denied the privilege to the defendant-spouse who had committed
a crime against the person of the witness-spouse. 20 Today, one of the
last major areas of common-law application appears to be the federal
courts.
2 7
The public policy reasons advanced for the rule are the necessity
of protecting marital harmony and the natural repugnance of causing
one spouse to be the means of the other's condemnation.
28
The first reason for the rule against adverse spousal testimony was
clearly expounded in the federal courts for the first time in the 1839
case of Stein v. Bowman29 in which the Court said:
"This rule is founded upon the deepest and soundest principles
of our nature. Principles which have grown out of those domes-
OGoodson v. State, 162 Ga. 178, 132 S.E. 899, 9O1 (1926); State v. Hancock, 28
Nev. 300, 82 Pac. 95, 96 (i9o5); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2230 (3d ed. 1940); 25 Notre
Dame Law. 382 (1950).
2'8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2234 (3 d ed. 1940).
nShores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 841 (8th Cir. 1949); United States v.
Mitchell, 137 F.2d ioo6, 1007-o8 (2d Cir. 1943); State v. Mageske, 119 Ore. 312,
227 Pac. 1o65 (1924); McCormick, Evidence § 66 (1954); 3 Vernier, American Family
Laws § 226 (1935); 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2241 (3 d ed. 1940).2 This exception first appears to have been recognized in Lord Audley's Trial,
Hutt. 115, 123 Eng. Rep. 1140, 1141 (1631). It is an exception based on the necessity
of procuring a witness to a crime committed by the husband on the wife. The ma-
jority of courts require that the husband's action be one of physical violence before
the exception applies and allows the wife to testify against her husband. A moral
wrong to her or a public wrong is not sufficient. Johnson v. United States, 221 Fed.
250, 251 (8th Cir. 1915); Meade v. Commonwealth, 186 Va. 775, 43 S.E.2d 858 (1947);
State v. Woodrow, 58 W. Va. 527, 52 S.E. 545, 546 (1905); McCormick, Evidence §
66 (1954); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 ('935); 8 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2239 (3d ed. 1940). The federal courts have extended the exception to cover
violations of the Mann Act as a serious moral wrong. United States v. Rispoli, 189
Fed. 271 (E.D. Pa. 1911). Accord, Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 841 (8th
Cir. 1949); Levin v. United States, 163 F.2d 992 (5 th Cir. 1947); United States v.
Mitchell, 137 F.2d lOO6, lOO8-O9 (2d Cir. 1943). See Annot., 3 L. Ed. 2d 1607 (1959);
Annot., 97 L. Ed. 607 (1953).
7Annot., ii A.L.R. 2d 646 (1950). For a discussion of individual state statutes
concerning the privilege, see 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (1935); 38 Va.
L. Rev. 359 (1925).
nHawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958); Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 2o9 (1893); Commonwealth v. Allen, 191 Ky. 624, 231 S.W. 41 (1921); Mc-
Cormick, Evidence § 66 (1954); 3 Vernier, American Family Laws § 226 (1935); 8
Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d ed. 1940).
238 US. (13 Pet.) 2o9 (1839).
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tic relations, that constitute the basis of civil society, and which
are essential to the enjoyment of that confidence which should
subsist between those who are connected by the nearest and
dearest relations of life. To break down or impair the great
principles which protect the sanctities of husband and wife,
would be to destroy the best solace of human existence."
30
Is this rule logical? Some authorities feel that it is based purely on
"sentiment" rather than logic.31 However, individual marriages are
based upon sentiment and emotion 2 so that any action which tends to
place the parties in opposition to each other will naturally weaken
the harmonious emotional union between them. Certainly, legal ac-
tion which compels one to be a witness against the other in a criminal
case falls within this category. Assuming that the basic reason for the
rule is the protection of the marriage institution itself,33 then the
logic-not sentiment-of the law is that the institution is best pro-
tected by recognizing and protecting the sentimental basis of the in-
dividual marriages.3 4 The rule is based on the premise that it is more
desirable to preserve a particular marriage than to secure a particular
criminal conviction.
Many writers argue that if a wife will voluntarily3 5 testify against
her husband in a criminal case,36 there is no harmony left in the
marriage to be protected.37 However, as Judge Learned Hand pointed
out in United States v. Walker,3 8 even though there may be present
bitterness between the parties, "not all estrangements are final, and
"Id. at 223.
018 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3d ed. 194o); Hines, Privileged Testimony of
Husband and Wife in California, ig Calif. L. Rev. 39o (1931); 4 Ark. L. Rev. 426
(1950).
1 -fhe rule is founded on "common sense." Compellability of Husband and Wife
as Witnesses Against One Another in Criminal Cases, 94 Just. P. 691 (1930).
"'The privilege necessitates a balancing of the desire for protection of marriage
against the desire to obtain ultimate truth by testimony in criminal trials. The
privilege requires a favorable balance for marriage. 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228
(3 d ed. 194o); Moser, Compellability of One Spouse to Testify Against the Other
in Criminal Cases, 15 Md. L. Rev. 16 (1955); 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 323 (1959)-
3'See note 32 supra.
1 1The writers suggest that if the wife voluntarily testifies there is no harmony
left to protect. However, it would appear that where she refuses to testify and must
be compelled, she is indicating that there is harmony in the marriage to be pro-
tected.
30 The writers seem to presuppose guilt-a presumption hostile to our system
of justice. It should not be assumed that all harmony in the marriage has ceased
because one of the parties has been accused of a crime. Mere indictment for a crime
is not conviction.
37The United States's argument in Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
See also, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2228 (3 d ed. 1940); 19 Fed. B.J. 85 (1959); 12 Vand.
L. Rev. 947 (1959).
38176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1949).
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nothing could more dispose the privileged spouse to treasure enmity
and to repulse any overtures of reconcilliation than the memory of
what will ordinarily rankle as treachery."3 9 Mr. Justice Black, in
Hawkins v. United States,4 1 reiterated Judge Learned Hand's argu-
ment stating that:
"Not all marital flare-ups in which one spouse wants to hurt
the other are permanent. The widespread success achieved by
courts throughout the country in conciliating family differ-
ences is a real indication that some apparently broken homes
can be saved provided no unforgivable act is done by either
party. Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would,
we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage."4'
Does this reason for the privilege still exist today? It has. been
contended that the family has become less unified and hence the
present day need for the privilege is considerably weakened.42 How-
ever, it may be argued that with a recognized decline in family unity,
as evidenced by our increasing divorce rate, any rule tending to per-
petuate marriage should be retained. The Supreme Court in Hawkins
seemed to agree with this position when Justice Black, speaking for
a unanimous Court, said:
"The basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against hus-
band or husband against wife in a trial where life or liberty is
at stake was a belief that such a policy was necessary to foster
family peace, not only for the benefit of husband, wife and
children, but for the benefit of the public as well. Such a belief
has never been unreasonable and is not now."'43
The second reason for the rule is the "natural repugnancy" con-
cept 44 which is based on the argument that our law has always felt
an aversion to seeing a person convicted by the testimony of his spouse.
It is an appeal to the "sporting" nature of the law.45 If this seems
to defeat justice, it must be remembered that all privileges are
truth defeating.4 6
Wi76 F.2d at 568.
"'358 U.S. 74 (1958).
4358 U.S. at 77-78.
-2Hutchinm & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Family
Relations, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 675, 678-80 (1929); 61 W. Va. L. Rev. 323, 324-25 (1959).
'3358 U.S. at 77.
"Even Wigmore finds this argument more "plausible." 8 Wigmore, Evidence §
2228 (3 d ed. 1940 ) .
"r8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2288 (3d ed. i94o); Hines, Privileged Testimony of Hus-
band and Wife in California, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 390, 408 (1931).
'United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564, 568 (2d Cir. 1949); Hines, Privileged
Testimony of Husband and Wife in California, 19 Calif. L. Rev. 390 (1931).
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